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FREEDOM AND GOOD
IN THE THOMISTIC TRADITION*
Thomas Loughran

Alasdair MacIntyre has presented an interpretation of the Thomistic tradition
according to which moral principles are grounded in tradition-gathered wisdom concerning the good for human beings. In this essay I sketch a route to
MacIntyre's conclusions departing from the kind of informed-desire analysis
of good to which utilitarian moral philosophers have recently drawn attention. On the way, I identify two relativist challenges regarding the good so
conceived-arising respectively from human cognitive limitations and from
human freedom-and show how the Thomistic tradition has the resources to
overcome them.

I
For more than a decade Alasdair Macintyre has attempted to revive the
Aristotelian tradition of moral inquiry. According to that tradition-advanced
by and inherited from Aquinas-universal moral principles are based upon
common human requirements for prosperity. These common requirements
constitute our common end or telos, our good.! The good for an individual
human being is measured by how that person would exercise practical judgement were he or she both adequately informed and virtuous; the good for all
human beings consists in what is common among what is good for each
individual human being.2 For Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Macintyre, any objective account of what is good for all human beings and of universal moral
principles based upon that account will depend on there being truths about
both what sorts of habits count as virtue for each individual, and about what
practical judgements each virtuous person would make under adequately
informed circumstances. With respect to both of these prerequisites, relativist
challenges can be mounted.
Concerning the second prerequisite, it can seem as if there is no useful
sense in which how a person would freely choose under even fully informed
circumstances is a question of fact. If human beings are free with respect to
their choices, it would seem either that there is no fact of the matter about
how even well-informed virtuous persons would choose, or that in any case
we could not know how such persons would choose until they do choose. A
response to this challenge will require an analysis of the nature of human
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freedom, and an examination of St. Thomas' teaching on human freedom is
the main burden of this essay.
Before taking up that burden, however, it will serve to whet our appetites
for a resolution to this second difficulty if we understand how the Thomistic/Aristotelian tradition-as advanced by Macintyre-has the resources for
overcoming the first. Let us consider in overview, then, the place of virtue
in an Aristotelian understanding of the good, an argument for relativism with
respect to virtue (and thus the good), and how in Macintyre's work the
resources may be found to overcome this first relativist challenge.

II
An understanding of the role which virtue plays in human life emerges from
consideration of ordinary practical reasoning. The good, understood as the
goal of practical rationality, is clearly related to desire, while it is just as
clearly not the same as whatever is actually desired. 3 Some objects of desire
we judge to be not good, and some goods are not desired. We regret some of
the practical judgements we make, and that regret arises from consideration
of information about our options (taking information in a very broad sense,
including awareness, experience, insight, and the like). Reflection on such
familiar features of practical rationality as these have led philosophers from
the ancients to contemporary informed-desire theorists to attend to the role of
information in the process of the formation of successful practical judgements. 4
When we consider the amount and kinds of information which influence
our practical decision-making, we encounter an important difficulty with
attempts to analyze the good along informed-desire lines. If the good of
practical rationality is somehow tied to the object of practical judgements
made in light of information about our options, then the very range of options
and of the amount and kinds of information about those options seem to
suggest that each human practical judgement is inescapably underinformed.
Human beings have a variety of information-gathering resources: we learn
from our own past experiences; we observe the experiences of others; we
seek advice. All such information-gathering mechanisms require a measure
of time and energy for assessing the experiences observed or described,
however. But there are limits to our time and energy for, and the reliability
of, such individual assessments. At least some significant experience of rival
ways of living seems necessary for an adequate assessment of those rival
options. But no human being can have significant experiential knowledge of
all of the rival ways of living which are options for him or her.
Suppose we roughly define information as relevant to a given choice for a
given person if and only if that information could possibly be assessed by
that person and would affect the outcome of that choice if it were assessed. 5
Suppose further that a person is adequately informed about an option just in
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case he or she possesses and can assess all the information relevant to that
option. Given these rough accounts of relevance and adequacy, we can state
one problem for informed-desire theorists-call it the cognitive limitations
problem-in the following way. It would seem that a given human being
could possibly gather and assess any relevant information, even while it
remains impossible-exceeding human cognitive capacity-for him or her to
gather all relevant information for a given choice. Human beings seem inescapably under-informed and hence inadequately informed about their options.
Thus, there would seem to be no fact to the matter about how human beings
would choose if adequately informed about their options. But if there are no
facts about how any person would choose if adequately informed, there are
no facts about how any virtuous person would choose if adequately informed.
If we attempt to understand the good for human beings as roughly what the
adequately informed virtuous person would choose, it seems that there will
be no fact of the matter about what is good for human beings.6
Informed-desire theorists-Aristotelian, or not-might be tempted to yield
to this cognitive limitations problem by defining the good in terms of desires
elicited from consideration of some actually available store of information,
even if that information is not all the information relevant to the choice of a
given option. But that response to the cognitive limitations problem runs us
head-long into a variety of relativism, and resourcelessly. For since the particular store of information each person could actually acquire will be different for each of the different sets of life experiences possible for him or her,
any choices a person could make will not only be underinformed but also
underinformed in a unique way, subject to his or her particular set of actual
life experiences. Human beings would be destined to make decisions based
on information which is never as much as is relevant to their choices, and is
always just some particular limited sample. What promise could there be,
then, for identifying some information-conditions as normative, under which
the object of such choices would constitute an objective good? The amount
and kinds of information relevant to our practical judgements, coupled with
what seem like inescapable limitations on human capacity for gathering and
assessing that information, would seem to lead to a sort of personal perspectival relativism regarding the objects of our best-informed desires.
Fortunately, the Aristotelian tradition has substantial resources for resolving problems posed by human cognitive limitations, including this problem
of personal perspectival relativism. The cognitive limitations of individual
human beings can be overcome in community. There are ways in which our
choices can be made to respond to the kind of information on which we seek
to base our decisions in practical reasoning, without our own time, energy,
and expertise being called upon at all. It is possible that our choices can be
deliberately influenced by other human beings who are in possession of
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information about how we would choose from among rival options under not
ideal but actual knowledge conditions. To take but one example, consider
parents who know-let us suppose for now that they know, and discuss
justification later-that their child would be glad to have been raised as an
honest person, were she to experience the advantages which a lifetime's
exercise of honest character has over other familiar lifestyles incorporating
rival attitudes toward truth-telling. These parents might deliberately construct
their child's environment so that the choice of behavior promoting an honest
character is experienced by the child as obviously choiceworthy. The child's
choices can be influenced by a system of incentives and examples which the
parents arrange precisely to mirror what they know to be the consequences
of truth-telling behavior in the kinds of actual conditions they know their
child is likely to encounter.
Human beings with more information about our options than we ourselves
have acquired can lead us to choose in actual conditions what we ourselves
would have chosen under better informed conditions. In the formation of
language, character, customs, institutions, stories, etc., we can bring information to bear on one another's choices without each individual having to
cognitively process all of the information actually contributing to the formation of those choices. In happy circumstances, information which others have
gathered is part of the rationale behind the social structures which serve as
the context within which the members of a community perceive their options,
make their choices, and form their characters. Up to the full store of information which a community has gathered can serve to shape, and thus can
come in that sense to be stored in, the character of its members.
The more a community agrees that it knows about the ways in which human
beings would choose from among options familiar to it, the more confidence
that community will have in structuring the formation of its less mature
members in ways promoting the choice of what it has learned are the most
choiceworthy of those options. Through such formation, the cognitive limitations of individual human beings can be supplemented. In theory, the longer
a community's mechanisms for gathering and communicating practical wisdom are held in place, the greater will be the store of practical wisdom which
is embodied in the ideals, institutions and practices by which that community-that tradition-forms its members to maturity. As a tradition develops
and its mature members gather and assess an ever-richer store of information
about human options, the more plausible become its claims that it is overcoming the cognitive limitations of individual human existence-that it imparts wisdom-and that the habits of thought and character it inculcates are
virtues.
Human cognitive limitations are not the same as those of individual human
beings. then: humankind can gather information over an in-principle endless
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amount of time, whereas no individual human beings can. Yet humankind
faces cognitive limitations as well. Human knowledge is gathered by individual human beings and shared through particular acts of communication
among individual human beings. Any communal store of information about
human options will have begun in a particular place and will have accumulated along a particular route. There will be different human communities,
then, begun in different places and incorporating different sets of experiences
into different and rival formations. Human communities are diverse, both in
number and in standards of maturity, and present at a deeper level new
versions of the problems of cognitive limitations and relativism which arose
in consideration of individual human existence.
Suppose we ask, in view of the diversity of human communities. "which
tradition would it be good for me to be formed in?" If we understand such
questions along the lines of informed-desire analyses of good, then the best
tradition to be formed in is-roughly-that tradition which we would choose
to be formed in, were we to know what it would be like to be formed in all
of those traditions which are options for us. Of course, no human being could
know what it would be like to be formed in every possible tradition, even if
we restrict the domain of the possible to those traditions which have been,
are, or ever will be actual. It is clear that the same cognitive limitations
problem-with its relativist implications-for which appeal to formation in
tradition seemed to afford possible resolution has arisen anew, this time
regarding the assessment of traditions.
At this level too, the resources of tradition can serve to supplement the
limitations of individual human cognition. One tradition of inquiry might
engage its rivals in a systematic manner, its mature members mining the
resources and discovering the limitations of rival visions of maturity, and
incorporating this wisdom in the formation of the less mature members of
their own tradition. But each tradition will form its members to maturity
differently; they will have in some measure rival accounts of virtue and rival
assessments of other traditions. So whose virtue, which tradition of inquiry,
is to playa normative role in an individual's assessment of rival traditions?
There is no meta-tradition outside of all traditions, no "neutral" formation
outside of all possible formations from which to assess rival formations.
There seems to be no non-question-begging way to argue for the superiority
of one tradition's account of the good for human beings, over that of another;
rival traditions can be called incommensurable, in this sense. For at best any
such argument would be made from the standpoint of a mature inhabitant of
some rich tradition of inquiry with its own particular information base serving
as background for the character and judgments of its mature members. (The
situation for less mature members or for individuals formed in no rich tradition is even worse, since they too have been formed by their own sets of
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experiences, but less purposively, and in a way responding to even less information about the range of human options than that communicated in the
formation of mature members of rich traditions.) But the mature members of
rich rival traditions will have had different formations, and will have different
sets of experiences and different accounts of the good to appeal to as premises
in assessing the claims of rival traditions. We seem to be stuck. The limitations of human cognition, even when coupled with the resources of tradition,
seem to imply that all assessment of practical options-and thus all accounts
of the good for human beings-is inescapably tradition-bound. 7
Macintyre has argued for the most surprising claim that this sort of tradition-Iadenness of rational inquiry does not imply the impossibility of rational
consensus about the good life. 8 To the extent that an inhabitant of one tradition can come to share the formation common to mature members of another
tradition, he or she can come to imaginatively participate in the advantages
and disadvantages of "the good life" as the inhabitants of a rival tradition
conceive of it. 9 Any two rival traditions might be such that, when a given
mature inhabitant of each becomes immersed in the other as what Macintyre
calls a "second first-language speaker," the inhabitants of both traditions
would choose to inhabit the same tradition of the two. Insofar as the members
have been formed differently in rival traditions with different views of the
good, each would prefer that same chosen tradition for reasons which will
not at first be the same. A person might choose to leave her own tradition
behind, because of what she sees from the point of view of her original
tradition as the superiority of the other. MacIntyre discusses a number of
aspects of the process by which rival incommensurable traditions can be
compared: a) a given tradition might fail to offer solutions to practical or
theoretical problems which, from the perspective of its mature inhabitants, it
is committed to solve; b) the mature inhabitants of that first tradition might
come to find in some second tradition, once they come to inhabit it as a second
first-language speakers, coherent accounts of why those problems arose
within the first tradition, of why those problems were destined to remain
unsolved, and of how the second tradition has the resources to resolve or
avoid those problems; and c) these second-first language speakers of the
second tradition might come to find no similarly intractable problems internal
to the second tradition, from the perspective of the inhabitants of that second
tradition, and no resources from their home tradition capable of generating
such problems for those mature inhabitants of this second tradition who come
to inhabit the first tradition as second first-language speakers. lo
The crux of MacIntyre's claim is this: for any two people you pick who
have been formed differently in any pair of rival traditions, it is possible that
they may come to agree about the superiority of a single of those two rival
traditions, and this in spite of the lack of neutral ground from which to assess
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them. It is possible that one tradition may emerge as consistently chosen over
any other given tradition in such contests, and by persons with a wide range
of innate differences inhabiting each of the contesting traditions. By being
richly acquainted with the history of such an oft-chosen tradition, its inhabitants-native, and converted-might come to believe that stored in this victorious tradition is practical wisdom about how a wide variety of-perhaps
all-human beings would choose, were they to know what it was like to be
formed to maturity in both the victorious tradition and in any other. The
position taken by the well-meaning parents described above-that their child
would prefer to be formed to possess an honest character, if the child knew
what was at stake-seems possibly true, and possibly believed with some
justification to be true by mature members of some sufficiently rich tradition.
It may be that all human beings would choose the same tradition over any
of its possible rivals, were those traditions to be compared in something like
the manner just described. It is also possible that some existing tradition may
win out in similar comparison with any other existing tradition. One might
define human well-being roughly as the satisfaction of the desires any human
being would have, were he or she formed to maturity in that ideally victorious
tradition; 11 maturity in this tradition would require the development of habits
of mind and character which would constitute objective human virtue. Perhaps we could never know-abstracting from the possibility of revelationthat any actually existing tradition was this ideal tradition, but in the context
of an extended historical discussion among rival traditions we might identify
an actual tradition as the leading candidate yet to emerge from human history,
and the accounts of well-being and virtue nested in that tradition as superior
to any actually existing rival accounts. I2 The network of ideals, practices, and
institutional arrangements which are utilized in that best-tradition-so-far to
develop in its members mature habits of character would amount to the best
moral system which human beings have thus far produced. I3
Thus, in MacIntyre's development of the Thomistic moral tradition, there
is promise for overcoming one source of skepticism about the objectivity of
the good life: namely, that arising from the radical dependence of our choices
on our prior formation, due to the limited capacity of the human intellect.

III
There is, however, another source of skepticism about there being any objective good for all human beings, at least insofar as human good is understood
along the lines of the sort of informed-desire account just discussed. This
second source of skepticism is interestingly juxtaposed with the first when it
is described as arising from the radical lack of dependence of our choices on
our prior formation, due to the unlimited capacity of the human will. This
second challenge emerges from consideration of human freedom.
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Recall that according to the informed-desire account sketched above, the
good for any given human being is a function of how that human being would
choose were he virtuous and adequately informed. In order for it to be possible for a tradition to accumulate any knowledge about what is good for all
human beings, on informed-desire accounts of good, there must be truth
values for some counterfactual conditional propositions about how virtuous
human beings would choose. Since we are seeking an account of human good
which will serve as a foundation for morality, at least some of the choices in
question must be free choices, and thus at least some of truth-valued claims
about how individuals would choose must be counterfactual conditional
propositions describing how each individual would freely choose under specified circumstances. In order for a tradition to accumulate knowledge about
the good for human beings, some of these counterfactuals of freedom must
be knowable, and not only by the individual human beings to whose choices
these claims refer but also by other human beings who inhabit this tradition.
It is with respect to knowledge of these counterfactuals that certain analyses
of freedom raise doubts.
Suppose that in the circumstances depicted by some true counterfactual
conditional proposition specifying some human being's good, it remained
possible for that person to freely not exercise her choice in the way indicated
by that proposition. Were such a free refusal possible under those conditions,
then it would be possible that the person's good be other than what it in fact
is. Now if to have freedom in any libertarian sense with respect to a given
choice between contrary options requires the possibility of freely not exercising one's choice for either contrary of the pair, then it follows that no
objects of choice with respect to which we are free in any libertarian sense
are necessarily good for us, on the account of good we are considering.
Whether a given object is good for a given individual is a function of how
that person would choose under certain ideal circumstances, and on libertarian analyses of freedom there is more than one possible way for each individual to exercise his or her freedom under such circumstances.
Here, clearly, the problem of knowledge with respect to human good arises.
For if under ideal circumstances-where a person is virtuous and adequately
informed-it remains possible that she freely choose in a way other than how
she would in fact choose, how could anyone know in advance of the exercise
of such choices what another's or even one's own good is? For each person's
good just is what each would choose under such circumstances.
Perhaps some libertarian account of character could be worked out according to which a virtuous person is know ably more likely to exercise his choice
in one way rather than another in fully-informed circumstances, even while
remaining free in some libertarian sense with respect to the choice in question. But if we coupled such an account of character with the analysis of good
we have been investigating, we would engender the implausible position that
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it might be good for a person to do just anything at all which a person is free
in a libertarian sense to do-to murder one's friends, say-although it probably isn't. For on the analysis of good we have been considering, the good
is a function of what a person actually-not probably-would do were she
virtuous and adequately informed.
Another possible direction for harmonizing libertarian accounts of human
freedom with our emerging informed-desire account of good is this: libertarian freedom might be viewed as a means to the end of a virtuous character.
One might admit that virtuous persons lack libertarian freedom with respect
to some pairs of contraries (to murder a friend, or not), but insist that such
character-restrained choice scenarios retain their moral character in virtue of
the libertarian free choices made in the process of formation of that character.
One might define the good for human beings in terms of the outcome of ideal
and derivatively free choice scenarios of this type. 14
The problem with this two-tiered libertarian informed-desire analysis, it
seems to me, is this: such analyses seem to lack the resources for giving an
account of virtue in terms of the good. We have defined virtue, roughly, as
those habits of thought and character which would characterize maturity in
an ideally victorious tradition. Maturity in such a tradition has claim to being
good for its members insofar as formation in that tradition utilizes information about how its less mature members would choose, were they in possession of a richer store of information about their own options than they in fact
possess. But on the proposed two-tier libertarian analysis, only probable
knowledge (at best) can be had concerning the outcome of those choices of
less-than-virtuous persons who are free in a libertarian sense. So maturity in
any given tradition, including that ideally-victorious tradition whose account
of maturity is to be normative for virtue, would be at best only probably good
for a given person, only probably in accord with what he or she would have
chosen in light of adequate knowledge of various sets of options. But perhaps
the advocate of libertarian analyses of freedom can define the virtues along
the lines of habits which are probably good for human beings.
I am in no position to claim that an objective and knowable account of
human good cast in terms of an informed-desire analysis is incompatible with
every possible libertarian analysis of human freedom. I do mean to suggest
that libertarian analyses of human freedom raise difficult obstacles for the
development of such an account of human prosperity. For the development
of an Aristotelian/Thomistic moral framework grounded on an objective account of human good understood in terms of an informed-desire analysis, we
might look elsewhere than to libertarian analyses for an account of freedom.
Since the metaphysics of freedom has been addressed rigorously within the
tradition which MacIntyre and others seek to revive, I suggest that we would
do well to reexamine St. Thomas' account of the nature and causal relations
of the human intellect and will.
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IV
The capacity for rational apprehension is the capacity to apprehend aspects
of reality which are not sensible. Aquinas called the faculty of rational apprehension the Intellect, and the faculty of inclination responding to such
apprehension, the Will. "The act of the Will," St. Thomas wrote, "is nothing
but an inclination which follows on an apprehended form, just as natural
appetite is an inclination which follows on a natural form."15 Whatever the
intellect can apprehend, the will can take as its object. That is, we can incline
toward whatever we can apprehend, since there is always something of being
in any apprehended object, and thus something desirable (as useful or for its
own sake) under some circumstances or other. 16
Though the will can incline toward whatever the intellect can apprehend,
all finite being can be apprehended insofar as it lacks being, and thus the will
need not incline toward any created apprehended object, since any such object
can be apprehended as lacking in being; that is, as lacking some mode of
being in virtue of which one might incline toward the apprehended object,
were it present instead of lacking.17 Thus, the ability of the intellect to abstract-to notice certain aspects of apprehended objects-is the ground of the
nonnecessary character of the will's inclination toward finite apprehended
objects. This is part of what St. Thomas meant by his claim that the root of
freedom is in the intellect: given the apprehension of any finite object, no
inclination of the will follows with necessity, since the intellect can apprehend that object insofar as it lacks being. IS
Freedom from necessity is one of the three conditions which St. Thomas
consistently designated as belonging to creaturely freedom; the other twoself-movement, and control-will be introduced shortly.19 First, though, we
should note that the freedom from necessity on the level at which we have
so far considered it is of a passive sort: the will is not moved of necessity by
any given apprehended object because of something which can happen to the
intellect, namely, its apprehending a given created object as good, or as
lacking in being in some respect, due it its ability to abstract. But there is a
second dimension of the power of the intellect which transforms the passivity
of the will's nonnecessitation. Among the aspects of created being which the
intellect can apprehend are its own acts (we can notice that we are thinking,
for example), and those of the Will (we can notice that we intend something
or other. 20) This capacity to apprehend its own acts and those of the will is
the intellect's capacity for reflection. The will, in turn, can have inclinations
corresponding to these reflective apprehendings, and these inclinations in
turn can be apprehended. A fuller description of the interplay between Intellect and Will would reveal even more complexity.
Since human beings can apprehend their own apprehendings and willings,
can incline toward these in various ways, and can apprehend the causes of
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these of their states, they can incline to change what they apprehend, what
they will, whether they apprehend, and whether they will. As rational animals,
human beings move themselves, like nonrational animals, in the sense that
their principle of motion for each act-the apprehended object-is internal
to them. Yet nonrational animals are passive with respect to what that internal
principle of motion, that apprehended object, will be. With rational creatures
things are otherwise. Because of their capacity for reflection-for apprehending the acts of the intellect and will-the source of the specification of their
internal principle of motion is also in a way internal to rational creatures. For
the intellect can apprehend its own acts, and the will can incline or not toward
any of these apprehended acts of the intellect.
Rational creatures are in this sense active with respect to their internal
principle of motion, the apprehended good, and so can be said to move
themselves in a richer sense than can nonrational animals. The intellect moves
the will, in the primary sense that the will's inclination just is a response to
the intellect's apprehension of an object. But the will also moves the intellect
to act, because the intellect can apprehend its own acts, and the will can
incline accordingly.21 The will moves the will, as well, since it is in virtue of
its inclination toward an end that the will inclines toward an object apprehended as a means to that end. 22 In this way, the will moves itself to act, as
well as moving the intellect and, in various ways and to various degrees, the
senses, the passions, and the executive powers-like speech-to act. 23
We have seen how the will is both not necessitated by any finite apprehended object, and that it can playa role in specifying which objects it will
apprehend, and in what way. Rational creatures have the full range of created
being as possible objects of inclination, and they can move themselves to
apprehend whichever objects they will in fact incline toward. Nonnecessitation coupled with self-movement amounts to control. Rational creatures not
only have control over how they will fulfill their desires (as nonrational
animals do), but over what their desires will be, whether or not they will yield
to them, and under what conditions. This control which rational creatures
have over their own acts is as indefinitely deep as is the intellect's capacity
for reflection. The control which rational creatures have over what they
incline toward has been called freedom of specification, and their control
over whether they will incline toward a given apprehended object, freedom
of exercise. 24 Aquinas clearly distinguished between these dimensions of
nonnecessitation of the will's act, and located the roots of both in the capacity
of the intellect to reflect on its own acts, as well as on those of the other
faculties, including acts of the Will. 25
It is particularly the will's control over the judgement of the intellect which
marks the choices of rational creatures as free. St. Thomas is explicit in his
claim that human free choice comes from our power over our own judgements
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in the Summa Contra Gentiles and the De Veritate. and he cites the intellect's
capacity to consider an apprehended object from a different point of view-a
capacity over the exercise of which the will has power-as the grounds for
the freedom and nonnecessitation of the will's act by its apprehended object
in the Prima Secundae and the De Malo. 26
The will, then, is a self-mover, moving itself from willing the end to willing
an apprehended means, and because particular acts of the intellect can be
among these suitable apprehended means, the will is able to playa role in
forming the intellect and the will, the wellsprings of fully human action.
According to St. Thomas the will is not only a self-mover, though, but is a
moved mover as well. St. Thomas understood being a moved mover and a
self-mover as fully compatibleY Having examined the sense in which the
will is a mover, we need next to explore the senses in which it is moved.
There are five important dimensions to the will's being moved which we
should briefly consider. First, the intellect moves the will, plainly, in its
presentation of apprehended objects. These do not necessitate the will's acts,
though, since the intellect can consider any finite apprehended object under
different aspects, so that it seems good under one and not good under another.
The will can incline toward a wide range of apprehended objects, but none
of these move the will with necessity. Hence, all that we can say about the
will's nature is that it inclines toward whatever the intellect apprehends as
good, which is to say toward the good in general. This is what St. Thomas
meant by identifying the universal good as the will's proper object: by its
nature, the will inclines toward whatever is apprehended as good. 28
Since the intellect can reflectively apprehend its own act of considering
any apprehended object, the will can incline toward that apprehended act and
can thus move the intellect from considering an object under one aspect to
consider it under another. Thus, the will has control over which apprehended
object moves the will; this control is freedom of specification.
In a second and related sense, God moves the will in virtue of His providence over the causes of the intellect's apprehending as it does. God exercises
this control without in any way necessitating the will's acts, for the nature of
the will remains open to being moved or not moved by any particular apprehended object. 29 Neither does God's control over the intellect's apprehending
as it does obviate the will's control over how the intellect apprehends. Thus,
neither the proximate nor ultimate (nor, a fortiori, any intermediate) causes
on the side of the object of the will's act are opposed to the will's freedom
of specification.
The next two senses in which the will is moved concern the exercise of the
will's act. In a third sense, the will moves itself, from willing the end, to
inclining toward the means. (The precise form of the will's inclination toward
the means can vary: from consent, to choice, to use.) We touched on the way
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in which the will moves itself when considering the various sorts of control
the will exercises; here we need to focus on the moved side of the will's
relationship to itself. The will is moved in virtue of its inclination toward the
end to choose the means: it is in virtue of my willing health, that I choose to
take the medicine I apprehend as productive of health. But the intellect can
apprehend various means to the same end, or apprehend a given means as
useful for one end though useless for or even impeding others, i.e., as not
suitable. Therefore, even while willing the end, the will is under no necessity
to move itself to choose an apprehended means.
The reduction from willing the end to willing the means takes place only
insofar as the means is considered as suitable to the end. But that act of
consideration can itself be apprehended by the intellect as good, or as not,
and the will can accordingly incline or not incline toward that apprehended
act of consideration, moving the intellect to continue that consideration or to
cease from doing so. Thus, the will has control over whether or not it will
reduce itself from willing an end to willing a certain means, even given the
apprehension of that means as suitable; this control is freedom of exercise.
The fourth dimension of the will's being moved is related to the third as
the second was to the first. In creating the will with the nature that it has and
in sustaining that nature in existence, God moves the will to the universal
good, that is, in accord with its nature. 30 St. Thomas' reasoning runs as
follows: since no particular end has been perpetually actually willed by any
given human will, the will must have come to will that end. But if the will
had moved itself to will that end, that end would have had to have functioned
also as a means to some further end: moving itself from willing the end to
willing the means is the only kind of self-movement St. Thomas allows for
the will, for nothing can reduce itself from potency to act in the same respect.
If the will moved itself to will the end, deliberation would have had to have
taken place for the will to move itself, from willing some further end to
willing what with respect to that act of will is the means, and with respect to
our original act is the end. No infinite regress of deliberation is possible,
though, and so at some point the will must be moved-in the order of exercise, and not only of specification-by something else. 31 That something else
must be God, Who alone is capable of moving the will by sustaining it in
existence with an inclination toward its natural object, which is the universal
good, the good-in-generaP2 Since God's movement of the will in this fourth
sense is toward whatever is good, the will's act of choice is not necessitated
by this divine motion, any more than by the divine control over the objects
of the intellect's apprehension, the second sense. 33 Nor does God's moving
the will to the universal good obviate the will's control over whether it moves
itself from willing the end to willing the means. So neither the proximate nor
highest (the only) causes moving the will to the exercise of its act are opposed
to the will's freedom of exercise.
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The fifth and final sense in which the will is moved by another is not only
distinct but also different from the others, since those four all apply to every
conceivable act of the will. St. Thomas thought, however, that sometimes
God moves the will in other ways besides His control on the side of the object
through the Providential arrangement of the causes of apprehension, and on
the side of the exercise of the act, by sustaining the will in existence with an
inclination toward whatever is apprehended as good. God also moves the will
through particular acts of grace: only sometimes, St. Thomas says.34 It is true
that grace is always available to every human being, but that grace is not
always efficacious. While many have held an interpretation of st. Thomas's
doctrine of application on which even grace which is nonefficacious in a
technical sense is nonetheless effective in applying the will to act, that view
of application has been effectively challenged by Bernard Lonergan. 35
Through grace God can move a person to apprehend what otherwise would
not have been apprehended, thus moving the will in the order of specification.
Or, in the order of exercise, God can simply incline a person toward what he
or she would otherwise not have been inclined toward (and this, either by
instilling a single inclination, or by infusing a virtue which would, if maintained, similarly effect all like acts.)36 As is true concerning the other senses
in which the will is moved, God's moving the will to choose by way of such
particular movements of grace does not necessitate the will, nor obviate its
control over-its proximate causal role in-the production of its acts. God's
moving the will is thus opposed neither to the will's freedom of exercise, nor
of specification. 37
Supposing the account I have sketched of the causes of the Will's acts is a
complete one, let us summarize the view of human freedom which emerges
from it. According to the interpretation I have presented, the will is moved
by any object it apprehends as good-which is to say, by any object which
when apprehended does in fact move the will-as by a sufficient cause. 38
Such apprehended objects are sufficient in St. Thomas's sense: when the
cause is posited, the effect follows always, unless some obstacle impedes the
cause. 39 Many things can impede the will's being moved by a rationally
apprehended good, and the will itself is among these. Because of the indefinitely deep capacity of the intellect to abstract and reflect, the intellect can
apprehend just any created object, including its own acts and those of the
will, as good, or as not. Thus, even when the intellect apprehends an object
which is sufficient to move the will, the will can impede that movement.
Because the intellect can apprehend its own acts, the will can move the
intellect to consider that sufficient cause of the will's movement as lacking
in being in some respect. So considered, that object which is sufficient to
move the will under some considerations will not in fact move the will. The
cause impeding the sufficient causality of that apprehended object is the will
itself, having moved the intellect to consider that sufficient cause differently.
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So the will has control over which apprehended objects it will incline toward:
this is freedom of specification. Nor need the will act even toward an object
which is being considered as good-this is freedom of exercise-since the
intellect can apprehend many other goods whose pursuit entails cessation of
its act of consideration of such an object, thus moving the will to move the
intellect to cease consideration of that object. This wondrous depth of the
intellect's capacities for abstraction and reflection is the ground of the substantial control which free creatures can exercise over their own lives.
Yet the will can move the intellect toward or away from any particular
apprehended object only in response to some additional act of apprehension. 40
This additional act of apprehension is either moved by the will, or not. If by
the will, then the will is being moved by the intellect's judgement of that
additional act of apprehension as good. The causes involved in the production
of any such chain of deliberation, however complex, must extend beyond the
will, if we are to understand the will as the rational appetite, the faculty of
response to rational apprehension. I am suggesting that we can understand
St. Thomas as viewing the will as a kind of response to rationally apprehended
stimulus. 41 On such a view, the sum of the causal influences on the faculty
of rational apprehension which are causally prior to any act of the created
will are what we in our day would call sufficient causal conditions for bringing about that particular act of the wil1. 42 Given the placement of such a full
set of causal antecedents, it is impossible for the will to act otherwise than
as it does. We in our day are inclined to view such a set of causal conditions
as necessitating those acts of the will w~ich follow inevitably from them, and
many would deny that any faculty or being whose acts were governed by any
such set of conditions could possibly be called free.
I do not see evidence that the existence of such a set of what we would call
sufficient causal conditions for the will's acts is precluded by anything St.
Thomas says about the nonnecessitation or freedom of the will. For St.
Thomas meant something different than we would in affirming or denying
necessity of a created effect, including effects which are acts of the will.
On Aquinas' understanding of causation and modality, the sum of causal
conditions operating on the will's act would not necessitate the will's act
because effects are called necessary precisely when they are the proper effects
of a per se cause which cannot be impeded in the production of its proper
effect. But the conjunction of causes sufficient for bringing about a particular
act of the will form-in the order of created causality-an accidental union.
This union constitutes a per accidens cause, the union itself having no higher
cause: "accidental being has no cause and is not generated."43
It is true that some conjunctions have a certain unity, a certain being, such
as intentional unions (like a meeting of servants in the market, planned by
the master who sent them) or natural ones (like a famiIy).44 When there is a
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natural or intentional ordering of the causes of an event, then from the point
of view of the orderer (the master, or God) the event is not a product of
chance, but of causation. In keeping with this model of the modality of
created effects, Aquinas held that insofar as they fall under the order of
Providence-the only higher cause governing the conjunction of all of the
causes of the will's acts-all created effects are found to be necessary.45 Yet
effects are called necessary or contingent after their proximate causes, not
their higher causes. 46 And so God determines not only which effects occur,
but also their modality (contingent or necessary) in assigning to some effects
causes which can, and others causes which cannot fail in the production of
their proper effects. 47
That contingent effects inevitably follow from the Divine placement of the
entire order of causation is asserted to be compatible with the contingency
of those effects.48 God transcends the created order, and He does not remove
the will's natural indeterminacy toward any particular finite object even as
he efficaciously determines the will's acts through his sustaining it in existence with the active inclination proper to its nature, his placing it toward
fulfillment of the plan of Providence in particular causal relationships with
other beings whose causality He likewise moves, and His additional activity
in the order of grace. Yet it remains true that on this account of the modality
of created effects, "the effect of every cause is found to be necessary insofar
as it comes under the control of Providence."49
The account of freedom sketched here is no received interpretation of St.
Thomas on these matters. But it is one which can survive without the Bafiezian interpretation of application on which Lonergan has cast doubt, and it is
one which can ground the causal certitude of providence, as any interpretation
of St. Thomas must. Of course, the claim that God has control over the actions
of free creatures is one which raises a range of well-known and difficult
problems. These problems can be seen as disadvantages of any view of human
freedom which supports such a view of providence, but they are problems
which must be left for another occasion. 50 Yet the view of freedom described
above has this advantage: it gives a grounding for facts about how any human
being would choose under any full set of circumstances, whether the person
is virtuous or not, and whether the circumstances are ideal, or not. So there
will be on this interpretation of human freedom a ground for facts about how
any virtuous person would choose if adequately informed. These latter are
facts of just the sort which specify the good for human beings, on the informed-desire account of good sketched earlier.

v
I have attempted in this essay to indicate the promise which the Thomistic
tradition shows for developing an informed-desire account of objective uni-
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versal human good. Two important obstacles threatening to impede that development have been identified, and solutions to them sketched. First, their
limited cognitive capacity seems to leave human beings inescapably underinformed about their options, and their good relative to their prior formation.
But it is possible that due to common underlying tendencies in human beings,
practical wisdom about human options can be gathered and stored in certain
kinds of traditions, overcoming in principle and possibly in fact the impact
of individual cognitive limitations on practical decision-making. It is also
possible that the incommensurability of rival traditions can be overcome
through the kind of dialectical engagement which MacIntyre has been recovering from the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. So it is
possible that there is an objective good for all human beings, understood
roughly as what every human being would incline toward were he or she
formed to maturity in that tradition which would emerge victorious in any
adequate engagement with its rivals.
A second obstacle, emerging from consideration of human freedom, casts
doubt upon whether we can know either what tradition would emerge as
freely chosen by any person over any of its rivals, or how any given person
would freely choose were he or she formed to maturity in any given tradition.
But the Thomistic tradition shows promise for supporting a rich account of
human reason, causality, and modality on which rationally apprehended objects exercise causal power without necessitating the acts of the will nor
removing the will's own kind of causal primacy in fully human action. On
this view of human freedom, there is a fact of the matter with regard to how
any given person would choose under any fully specified set of circumstances, including when formed to maturity in an ideally-victorious tradition.
What I have tried to do in this essay is to utilize resources from the Thomistic tradition to resolve two major difficulties standing in the way of an informed-desire analysis of objective universal human wellbeing. What I have
not tried to do is argue that such a grounding squares adequately with what
Aquinas himself had to say about the good, nor that such a grounding is
superior to the analyses of human good at work in other approaches to moral
theory in the Thomistic tradition. But as the paper's title suggests, I am
inclined to view the account of good sketched here as both in line with St.
Thomas' own teaching and as a credible alternative to rival interpretations.
If the account offered here is both of these, then some direction for future
work in Thomistic moral theory is suggested. If morality is to be understood
as something like the system of ideals, practices. and institutional arrangements which a tradition uses to form the character of its members to maturity,
then a central task of Thomistic moral theory is to articulate that tradition's
vision of human maturity, and to expose that vision through dialectical engagement to comparison with the respective visions of rival traditions. To
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enable that process. the kinds of social and psychological conditions necessary for forming human character to maturity in the Thomistic tradition need
to be identified. a task at once necessary for the moral dimensions of education and for moral philosophy. Also necessary is the conception and construction of the kinds of institutions necessary for enabling mature members of
the Thomistic tradition to achieve second first-language competency in rival
traditions, as well as for persons outside the Thomistic tradition to achieve a
like competency in it. Finally, a range of acceptable fora must be negotiated
between members of the Thomistic tradition and rival traditions for dialogue.
Of course, all these are tasks to which Alasdair MacIntyre has drawn our
attention and toward which he has made early progress. But as the history of
the Thomistic tradition reveals, early progress must be solidified by well-conceived institutional arrangements. It is toward the construction of such arrangments that a substantial part of future work in Thomistic moral theory
must be directed, an effort on which the recovery of the Thomistic tradition
(and indeed of common morality) depends.
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1. See MacIntyre's "Moral Philosophy: What Next?" in MacIntyre and Hauerwas, eds.,
Revisions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) pp. 10, 11.
2.For a discussion of Aristotle's conception of good, see MacIntyre's Whose Justice?
Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), ch. VII,
esp. pp. 106-18; for a discussion of Aquinas' conception, see MacIntyre's Three Rival
Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990),
Lecture VI.
3. Throughout the first two parts of this paper I will use the terms desire, inclination,
choice, and practical judgement loosely. In spite of the clear distinctions made in Thomistic tradition between various components of human action, I think this loose usage is
appropriate. All appetite, sensitive and rational, is a kind of inclination. Desire in its
colloquial sense seems a working synonym for inclination prompted by some kind of
awareness.
4. For contemporary versions of informed-desire analyses of "good," see James Griffin's Wellbeing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) and Peter Railton's "Facts and Values,"
in Philosophical Topics, vol. 15, No.2 (Fall, 1986). I argue that these contemporary
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accounts pose philosophical difficulties which seem to require for their resolution a return
to an Aristotelian conception of communal inquiry into the good life in "Tradition and
Informed-Desire Accounts of 'Good' ," presented to the 1994 Central Division Meeting
of the American Philosophical Association.
5. "As finite beings, we may be incapable of being fully informed about ourselves and
our world, or of assessing in an appropriate way the relevance of so many considerations.
How, then, are we to evaluate counterfactuals about what one would desire if one were
fully informed and rational?" Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," p. 19.
6. One might want to argue that to be adequately informed about a given option requires
being informed about its rival options, and thus may require having experiential knowledge of what it would be like to choose as a virtuous person would choose with respect
to that option; it may be that to have adequate information about certain options, one must
have virtue.
7. In the argument so far I have oversimplified the case for relativism regarding
judgments about the good; in particular I have ignored the fact that not all information is
relevant to any given choice (although I think it is easy to underestimate the amount and
kinds of information which is relevant.) But my aim in sketching this argument for
relativism is to suggest the resources for overcoming it in MacIntyre's account of the
rationality of tradition/craft. For a relatively accessible proper argument setting up the
problem of relativism of the kind discussed here, see MacIntyre's "Relativism, Power, and
Philosophy" in Kenneth Baynes. et ai, eds., Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987).
8. "What is needed at this point is to consider first more generally the way in which the
incommensurability involved in certain radical disagreements may be both recognized and
rationally overcome within the context of a certain kind of tradition." Three Rival Versions
of Moral Enquiry, p. 118.
9. For Donald Davidson's objections to the notion of incommensurability at work here,
see "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 183-98; MacIntyre's replies can be found in
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, chapter XIX, and Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry, Lecture V.
10. See chapter XVIII of MacIntyre's Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
11. To develop this rough account further, two points would have to be made. First,
some cognitive content-some account of adequate information-must be included in or
perhaps added to any analysis of a mature member of an ideal tradition whose desires are
to function normatively in specifying his or her good: what is needed is something like
an understanding of the virtues, and an acquaintance with those circumstances surrounding
a given choice which a mature member of that tradition would deem relevant to that choice.
Second, we would need to unite under a single account the various ways of analyzing
wellbeing, ways which can seem to diverge under too narrow understandings of human
good. On the account suggested here, the good is the object of the inclinations of the
adequately informed and virtuous person; these objects of inclination produce enjoyment
("desire satisfaction") when attained; since the most important human inclinations are not
toward momentary enjoyment of objects to be acquired and consumed, but toward
relationships with ideas and persons, the good is well described as activity in accord with
virtue.
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12. The following is something like the analysis I have in mind: A state of affairs S is
good for person P (at t) iff S is actualizable (at t) and is such that for any other state of
affairs S' which is actualizable (at t) and noncompossible with S, P would prefer S to S'
in choice situations where P had adequate information (enough experiential knowledge
so that no more would affect how P would choose) about both Sand S', were P to conceive
of both Sand S' from the standpoint of a mature inhabitant of that tradition T which is
both inhabitable by P, and is such that for any rival tradition T' where adequate information
(ftrst- and second ftrst-Ianguage competency) concerning both T and T' is compos sible
for P, P would prefer to inhabit T over T' in light of that information. MacIntyre's reference
in chapter XX of Whose Justice? to an "emerging Thomistic conclusion" can be taken as
implying a measure of conftdence that the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and
Aquinas is that tradition T.
13. The complexity of such a network would preclude offering any single unifying
characterization of it other than what is needed for the formation to maturity of the
members of a tradition. If over time a tradition loses not only its vision of maturity but
even its grasp on the very concept of full human maturity, its supporting structures would
erode, there being no unifying conception for them other than that full conception of
maturity. Attempts to reunify them on other grounds would fail, and the breakdown of
these social structures would be the disappearance of the practical wisdom noncognitively
stored in them, "a grave cultural loss." Hence, After Virtue. (Alasdair MacIntyre-University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 1984; p. 22).
14. Fred Freddoso, Al Howsepian, and Michael Murray all suggested something like
this libertarian alternative to me. I am grateful to each of them for their extensive and
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
15. Summa Theologiae (hereafter, Sn I, q. 87, a. 4:." .. actus voluntatis nihil aliud est
quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est
inclinatio consequens formam naturalem."
16. Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter, SCG) II, 47, (5), and 48, (6).

17. De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6; STI, q. lOS, a. 4 and I-II, q. 10, a. 2;

De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.
18. STI-II, q. 10, a. 2, and q. 17, a. I, ad 2m; De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.

19. On nonnecessitation: De Veritate q. 22, a. 6; ST I, q. 82, a. 1; In III De Anima, L.
3, (621); De Malo, q. 6, a. 1. On self-movement: De lkritate, q. 24, a. 1; SCG II, 48 (3);
ST I, q. 83, a. Ic, ad 3m; Compendium Theologiae I, c. 76; De Malo, q. 6, a. 1; On control:
De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1,2,4; SCG II, 48 (2).

20. ST I, q. 87, a. 4; I-II, q. 17, a. 1.
21. ST I, q. 82, a. 5.
22. ST I-II, q. 9, a. 3.
23. I am leaving aside a good many complexities arising from the distinction between
commanded and elicited acts: the will can move itself and other faculties either directly,
indirectly, or (for some faculties) both. For a discussion of the complexities of the complete
human act, see Alan Donagan's "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action" in Kretzmann et aI.,
eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge University Press,
1982) pp. 642-54.
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24. The distinction between these dimensions of human freedom is discussed most
clearly in De Malo, q. 6, a. 1; ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, and q. 10, a. 2.
25. Some interpreters (see Joseph 1. Sikora, S. 1., "Freedom and Nihilation," The
Modern Schoolman, vol. 43 (1965), p. 23ff.) have identified freedom of exercise as the
root of freedom of specification, and thus as the most basic element of freedom. It seems
to me that St. Thomas's position was precisely the reverse. It is because the intellect can
apprehend its own acts as particular goods-and thus as good or as not good in some
respect-that the will is able to incline or not to incline toward the intellect's continuing
to consider a given object under the aspect of good and suitable. Hence, particular
apprehended objects need not move the will, even if the intellect's assessment of them
continues to be that they are both good and suitable, because the intellect can focus on its
own continued apprehension under an aspect in which that continued apprehension is not
both good and suitable. See De Malo q. 6, a. 1; ST I-II, q. 10, a. 2.

26. De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1, a. 2; SCG II, 48; ST I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2;
De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.
27. ST I, q. 83, a. 1 ad 3m, and I-II, q. 9 a. 4 ad 1m, 3m; Compendium Theologiae I,
129; De Malo, q. 6, a. 1 ad 4m.
28. De Veritate, q. 22, a. 9; ST I, q. 82, a. 4, and I-II, q. 9, a. 6;
De Malo, q. 6. a. 1.
29. ST I-II, q. 6, a. 1 ad 3m.
30. De Veritate, q. 22, a. 9; ST I, q. 82, a. 4, and I-II, q. 9, a. 6;
De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.
31. ST I-II, q. 9, a. 4, and SCG III, 89, (8); De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.
32. STI-II, q. 9, a. 6, corpus and ad 3m.
33. ST I, q. 83, a. Ie, and ad 3m, and q. lOS, a. 4, ad 2m; ST I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3m, and
q. 9, a. 4, ad 1m, 3m; De Malo, q. 6, a. 1 ad 4m.
34. ST I-II, q. 9, a. 6 ad 3m, and q. 109, a. 2.
3S. See De Malo, q. 3, a. 1, a. 8 on the universal availability of grace; see Bernard J.
Lonergan, S. J., Grace and Freedom (New York: Herder and Herder) 1971, ch. 4 on
application; see also Fr. David Burrell, C. S. C., "Jacques Maritain and Bernard Lonergan
on Divine and Human Freedom" in Deal W. Hudson and Dennis W. Moran, eds., The
Future of Thomism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).
36. STI-II, q. 111, a. 2.
37. STI-II, q. 10, a. 4 ad 1m.
38. De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 15m.
39. In VI Libras Metaphysicorum, L. 3 (1192,3); SCG III, 86 (12); ST I-II, q. 7S, a. 1,
ad 2m.

40. ST 1, q. 82, a. S, ad 3m; SCG III, 89, (8); De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.
41. On this view, St. Thomas never abandoned, but only developed the view that the
will is always ultimately moved by another. Even when it moves itself, the will in one
respect moving itself in another-it is always moved to move itself by another. Freedom
is not incompatible with causation simpliciter, just with the kind of causation which would
remove the will's radical proximate contingency, rooted in the intellect's radical capacities

FREEDOM AND GOOD

435

for abstraction and reflection. This reading of St. Thomas runs counter to the view that
St. Thomas underwent a gradual but deep reversal of position on the question of necessitation and freedom. (See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, p. 51 and note 31, and
pp. 94-95.) I think that St. Thomas's language regarding necessity and voluntariness
underwent development not because his view of the natures and capacities of the intellect
and the will changed substantially, but rather because he worked out the implications of
their natures and capacities in light of the more complex treatment of the modality of
created effects developed in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
42. Here as elsewhere I have omitted a discussion of the role of the faculties of sensory
apprehension and appetite (the passions). Including mention of these and the causes
operating on them would complexify but not substantially alter the overview of the nature
of the intellect, will, and their causes offered here. See ST I-II, q. 9, a.2; q. 10, a. 3; and
then q. 6, a. I ad 3m.

43. In VI Metaphysicorum, L. 3, 1201: "ens per accidens non habet causam neque
generationem;" also, De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 21: "Nor again is it true that everything that
is done has a natural cause, for those things which are done per accidens are not done by
any active natural cause, since what is per accidens is not being and one." ("Nec iterum
verum est quod omne quod fit, habeat causam naturalem; ea enim quae fiunt per accidens,
non fiunt ab aliqua causa activa naturali; quia quod est per accidens, non est ens et unum.")
See also SCG, III, 74 (5).
44. In I Peri Hermeneias, L. 14; In I Ethicorum, L. 1,1. 5.
45. In VI Metaphysicorum, L. 3, 1220.
46. SCG III, 72, (2); In VI Metaphysicorum, L. 3, (1221).
47. In VI Metaphysicorum, L. 3, (1201); In I Peri Hermeneias, ch. 14; see also In VIII
Physico rum (1074).
48. Compendium Theologiae I, c. 140: "Much more, then, does the wisdom of the divine
economy bring it about that, although contingent causes left to themselves can fail to
produce an effect, the effect will inevitably follow when certain supplementary measures
are employed, which do not take away the contingency of that effect. Evidently, therefore,
contingency in things does not exclude the certainty of divine providence." ("Multo magis
hoc ex sapientia divinae dispositionis contingit, ut quamvis causae contingentes deficere
possint quantum est de se ab effectu, tamen quibusdam adminiculis adhibitis indeficienter
sequatur effectus, quod ejus contingentiam non tollit. Sic ergo patet quod rerum contingentia divinae providentiae certitudinem non excludit.")
49. In VI Metaphysicorum, L. 3, (1220): "Invenitur igitur uniuscuiusque effectus
secundum quod est sub ordine divinae providentiae necessitatem habere."
50. I have presented the model for interpreting St. Thomas discussed here in relation
to some of these problems-notably the problem of evil and predestination-in "Aquinas
on Free Choice and Providence: Three Views," unpublished.

